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ABSTRACT 
Experimental research suffers from biases introduced by experiment design choices, such as the choice of 
alternative incentive and reward structures.  We propose that framing rewards in a broader typology when 
researchers make decision about which reward structures to use in an experiment will minimise the potential for 
a false choice bias.  To highlight this problem we replicate Drake, Haka and Ravenscroft’s (1999) incentive 
structure experiment using a simpler, more theory driven design.  Drake et al (1999) propose that organisational 
performance maybe be better if group compensation is given in preference to individualistic compensation, 
within the context of an information rich environment (using activity based costing).  In particular, Drake et al 
(1999) apply an experimental research design to test that proposition using U.S. MBA students.  Their results 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, given a group in preference to an individualistic incentive scheme, innovation, 
efficiency and profitability may improve.  We argue that this conclusion is inconsistent with the incentive 
structure choices faced by managers, the societal values of the U.S., culture and agency theories in general.  A 
possible explanation for Drake et al’s (1999) result is the use of a tournament incentive scheme as the basis for 
individual compensation.  As such, we replicate the Drake et al (1999) experiment using Australian university 
students and an individual profit incentive scheme as the basis for individual compensation.  Our results, in 
contrast to Drake et al. (1999), indicate that given an individual in preference to group incentive scheme, task 
performance improves in an information rich environment.  This experiment highlights the false choice bias that 
reduces the generalizability of experimental research in general and highlights the value of propositions couched 
in a broader reward typology. 
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2Introduction
Research into rewards and incentives has a long and often conflicting history, often between 
the development of analytical theories (Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1979) and empirical research at various levels of the 
organization (Welbourne and Gomez Mejia, 1995; Murphy, 1999; Prendergast, 1999).  The 
variation in practice between incentive scheme types, task structure, risk profile, the 
information environment and the sheer volume of incentive based research makes drawing 
practical generalizations from the incentive literature problematic.  Further, the lack of well 
established typologies increases the difficulty in developing a consistent theory of incentives.  
This study investigates how the lack of a well developed typology increases the potential for 
bias in experiment based research which attempts to study the impact of different incentives 
types on organisations.  Specifically, we investigate how the use of a compensation choice 
typology reduces the potential for a false choice fallacy in experimental research design.  
Conducting experiments using human subjects requires substantial resources, requiring 
tradeoffs to be made between the allocation of scarce resources and the benefits of the 
experiment.  For example, an important trade off is the choice of independent variable groups 
for the basis of comparison.  By choosing independent variables that to not reflect the 
underlying population, the generalizability of a piece of research is reduced by a limited 
selection bias.  In this way, scarce resources increase the potential of a false choice fallacy in 
the experiment design.  In order for a false choice, limited independent variables are offered 
as alternatives, when in fact there are ‘better’ alternatives that that are not included (Dowden, 
2008), introducing bias into the results.  We propose that by positioning a piece of research 
within a broader typology, the potential for a false choice fallacy is reduced.  We replicate 
part of Drake, Haka and Ravenscroft’s (1999) incentives and activity based costing (ABC) 
experiment to illustrate how using a broader typology in the selection of independent 
variables can lead to radically different findings. 
The Drake et al (1999; 2001) is chosen to replicate for two reasons.  First, it is an example of 
exemplary research published in a top tier accounting journal with an established and 
replicable methodology.  Second, other studies that consider the type of incentive 
compensation used by Drake et al (1999; 2001) suggest a ‘better’ independent variable as a 
dichotomous contrast.  Drake et al (1999; 2001) argue that, ceteris paribus, workers in the 
3United States perform better, and in that context improve organisational performance if given 
a group compensation scheme in comparison to workers given a tournament compensation 
scheme, in an information rich environment. They characterize tournament schemes as a 
specific type of an individual compensation scheme with ‘individually oriented incentives’ 
(Drake et al, 1999, p 325). Further, in their theory development they draw from Wruck and 
Jensen’s (1994, p 279) proposition that individual piece rate schemes which encourage 
individualistic actions “. . . destroy value by discouraging cooperation and teamwork” (Drake 
et al, 1999, p 326).  By comparing compensation schemes that have an individualistic versus 
a group focus, they provide evidence that group compensation is more efficient in an ABC 
setting relative to individualistic compensation.   
This study is motivated by an apparent gap in the literature as to which type of compensation 
scheme is efficient in an information rich environment.  On the one hand, Drake et al (1999) 
suggest that group compensation is efficient.  On the other hand, some researchers suggest 
that individual compensation is more efficient (Brown, Matolcsy and Wells, 2008).1
Although, it is difficult to disagree with Drake et al’s (1999) propositions, Wruck and Jensen 
(1994) note that there are a number of contingent factors that require address that require 
address before assuming that individualistic compensation which encourages competition is 
an inefficient contracting choice.  Potential contingent factors to consider when theorising 
whether individual compensation is efficient are task structure and participant cultural values.  
For example, in the context of agency theory, Brown, Matolcsy and Wells (2008) argue that 
individual compensation is more efficient that group compensation in information rich 
environments as individual effort is tightly linked to rewards (Holmstrom, 1979).  On the 
other hand, group compensation is more efficient that individual compensation where 
participant tasks are interdependent and there are gains from co-operation such as integrated 
firms (Brown et al (2008).  Arguably, the information environment and task structure are 
relevant independent variables when considering the relative efficiency of group 
compensation.   
                                                          
1 A tighter link between pay and performance can lead to increased effort (Holmstrom, 1979).  If the benefits of 
increased effort outweigh the costs of individualistic actions, then individual compensation may be an efficient 
contracting choice (Brown, Matolcsy and Wells, 2008).  
4Culture theories also suggest that, ceteris paribus, in the United States and in other Anglo2
countries, individual compensation will produce better organisational performance in some 
circumstances (Hofstede, 1993; Che and Yoo, 2001; Chiang and Birch, 2005).  The countries 
within the Anglo cluster are relatively Individualist, low on Power Distance, Masculine and 
low on Uncertainty Avoidance.  According to Hofstede (1993 p. 65) managers in countries 
that are high on individualism should link incentives (or bonuses) to an individual’s 
performance.3  Additionally, Chiang and Birtch (2006), suggest that workers in countries 
with an internal locus of control (Individualist and low on Power Distance), are more 
Masculine and have a high tolerance for uncertainty will perform better given an individual 
compensation scheme because of a greater fit between cultural values and incentive scheme 
attributes.  Further, incentives research emanating from the Anglo grouping of countries is 
dominated by theories that are closely related to agency theory, which implicitly posits that 
individual incentives are the cornerstone in designing an efficient compensation scheme 
(Murphy, 1999; Prendergast, 1999; Che and Yoo, 2001; Brown et al, 2008).4  This view is 
consistent with the cultural values of the above mentioned countries.  Therefore, national 
culture may be a relevant contingent factor when considering the relative efficiency of group 
versus individual compensation.   
We argue that the dramatic contrast between Drake et al’s (1999) findings and what is 
suggested by incentive and culture theories warrants further investigation.  The objective of 
this study is to explore the difference between the conclusions drawn from Drake et al (1999) 
and the propositions put forward by culture and agency theories.  With the aid of a reward 
typology (Chiang and Birtch, 2005; 2006), we argue that the compensation schemes used in 
Drake et al (1999) study do not reflect the choices faced by decision makers when selecting 
compensation schemes, thereby introducing the potential for a false choice fallacy.   
                                                          
2 The U.S., together with Australia, United Kingdom, and Canada are classified by Hofstede (1993) within the 
Anglo country cluster based on Hofstede’s (1980) four cultural dimensions: Individualism-Collectivism; High-
Low Power Distance; Masculinity-Femininity; and High- Low Uncertainty Avoidance. 
3 Refer also to Redding and Wong (1986); Kirkbride & Westwood (1993); Cable and Judge (1994).  
4 Agency theory implicitly assumes that all individuals (regardless of nationality) act predictably in a rational 
and self interested manner under same incentive structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Brown 
et al, 2007). 
5We replicate Drake et al’s (1999) ABC experimental task in an Anglo country with a critical 
exception; we use an individual profit compensation scheme rather than a rank order 
tournament for the following reasons.  Although theory and empirical evidence suggest that 
rank order tournaments and individual compensation schemes share the characteristic of 
increasing attention and effort on individual, rather than collective performance (Ranking and 
Sayre, 2000), they are different because tournaments involve overt relative performance 
evaluation.  Relative performance evaluation can lead to gaming behaviour including 
sabotage (Wruck and Jensen, 1994).  Therefore, a comparison between group compensation 
and tournament compensation schemes may not represent an efficient comparison between 
two diametrically opposite extremes, rather two different types of compensation.5  We 
suggest that by including tournament instead of a generic individual piece rate scheme, the 
results of Drake et al (1999) have limited generalizability and are easy to misinterpret.  One 
may conclude that Drake et al (1999) provide evidence that group compensation is an 
efficient choice of compensation scheme relative to individualistic schemes in information 
rich environments.  This raises the potential for a false choice fallacy, whereby in an effort to 
implement ABC, managers may use group compensation as per the recommendations of 
Drake et al (1999) without considering the potential efficiency of plain vanilla individual 
compensation schemes.  Given that group and individual compensation schemes are used in 
practice, replication of Drake et al (1999) using those schemes would provide results with 
improved generalizability, reducing the bias of a false choice. 
The research design is a controlled experiment using human subjects based on the simulated 
production task developed by Drake et al (1999).  A sample of sixty six students were 
recruited at a large Australian university business school.  Participants were randomly 
allocated to groups of three and given a production task involving building LEGOTM
                                                          
5 Differences in incentives provided by plain vanilla individual compensation schemes and rank order 
tournament schemes provide scope for differing behaviours, and in turn differing levels of efficiency.  For 
example, if a worker is performing below average under a piece rate individual compensation scheme, they still 
have an incentive to work as there is a linear expected pay-off from their individual effort.  On the other hand, 
under a rank-order tournament, underperformers have an incentive to work even less as the probability of 
achieving a high rank diminishes.  This is because the expected pay-off is significantly reduced.  It is perhaps 
for this reason that few, if any, firms employ rank order tournaments as the only form of compensation (the 
authors are unaware of any firm that has implemented a rank order tournament as the sold incentive scheme).  A 
common form of rank order tournaments adopted by firms is the promotion tournaments where there fewer 
higher paying promotion opportunities relative to the staff seeking promotion (Baker et al, 1988). 
6structures in a simulated assembly line.  Participants were given performance feedback using 
an activity based costing system.  The manipulation was in the form of different incentive 
structures, being either an individual or group compensation structure.6  To assess differences 
between treatment groups, the number of observed task innovations and work unit profits are 
compared, consistent with Drake et al (1999).   
This study contributes to cultural and incentive theory development by providing insight into 
the impact of cultural values on employee responses to different incentive schemes.  If indeed 
workers perform better given an individual compensation scheme, one may conclude that 
cultural values moderate the relationship between the type of compensation scheme and 
organisational performance. On the other hand, if the results show group compensation elicits 
better performance this suggests that national culture has little impact on the relationship 
between type of compensation scheme and organisational performance which is consistent 
with Drake et al (1999). 
Results based on sixty six Australian born university students provide support that in an 
information rich task such a Drake et al’s (1999) experiment, profitability is higher using an 
individual compensation scheme, relative to a group compensation scheme.  This is explained 
by a greater link between effort and rewards as well as a cultural preference for individual 
compensation schemes.  Further, there was no difference in the number of either individual or 
group innovations between compensation scheme types.  These findings contrast with Drake 
et al (1999), providing support for the proposition that positioning dichotomous relations 
within a broader typology can lead to radically different findings.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains the literature review and theory 
development, Section 3 discusses the research design, Section 4 presents the results and 
discussion and section 5 contains the conclusion and limitations.  
                                                          
6 One type of individual incentive structure is tested, being individual profit. One type of group incentive 
structure is tested, being group pooling of profits.
72 Literature review and theory Development
False Choice Dilemma 
The problems associated with the allocation of scarce resources in designing experimental 
research increases the potential to construct an argument that contains a logical fallacy.  A 
fallacy can be defined as “a pattern of reasoning that can lead from true premises to false 
conclusions” (Tymoczko and Henle, 1995, p. 242).  From the time of the ancient Greeks, 
identified logical fallacies play an important role in the philosophy of science.  For example, 
a logical fallacy that plays a prominent role in the modern philosophy of science is drawing 
generalizations from a sample that is not representative of the population.   
The false choice fallacy has particular relevance to experiment design choices.  The false 
choice is classified as an informal fallacy of relevance (Pirie, 1985).  Although we use the 
term false choice, this type of fallacy has various names in the literature.7  The main logical 
argument used in experimental research that is prone to a false choice has the following form:  
A or B are alternatives 
Not A because of X 
Therefore B is the preferred alternative 
This argument is common in experimental research and can be rephrased as:  
A or B are alternatives 
Because of X, B is expected to perform better than A.  
B performs better than A in controlled experiment  
Therefore B is the preferred alternative.   
As the false choice fallacy is an ‘intricate argument’ (Pirie, 1985), definitions have some 
variation, with some definitions focusing on one or several logical problems.8  A general 
definition is “considering a distinction or classification exclusive and exhaustive when other 
                                                          
7 For example, false alternative (Yanal, 1988, p234), bogus dilemma (Pirie, 1985, p 25), false dilemma or faulty 
classification (Fearnside and Holther, 1959, pp 32, 36), bifurcation (Engel, 1994), either/or fallacy (Engel, 
1994), black-and-white fallacy (Chase, 1956; Engel, 1994), fallacy of selection (Herrick, 2005, p 252). 
8 Ibid 
8alternatives exist” (Engle, 1994).  The argument is constructed by offering several actions (or 
alternatives) and articulating the consequences of those actions.  Since one of the 
consequences is superior, the argument forces a preference choice favouring the associated 
action.  Comparing tradeoffs between alternative choices in the form of a dilemma is a valid 
form of argument and by itself does not constitute a false choice.  However, when the 
alternative choices do not reflect the range of possible choices, the argument becomes a false 
choice (or bogus dilemma) (Pirie, 1985).   
The false choice fallacy can manifest itself in different ways.  First, when alterative choices 
are offered, where those choices are not actually alternatives.  For example, offering someone 
the choice between a steak or an apple to make up their dietary intake of fruit for the day.  
Second, by limiting the alternative choices.  For example, in trying to establish which fruit is 
the tastiest, comparing apples and oranges only, excluding bananas and other types of viable 
alternatives.  Third, by presenting choices as mutually exclusive, when they are not 
necessarily so.  For example, offering the choice between an apple and an orange when 
having both is an alternative.  The examples used are obvious exaggerations; however it is 
easy to see their relevance to experiment design, as discussed below. 
It is important to note that the false choice may be intentional or unintentional.  For example, 
an unintentional dilemma may be presented where the author is unaware of other alternatives 
or by believing the alternatives are exclusive when they are not (Fearnside and Holther, 1959, 
p 39).   On the other hand, sales people and frauds often offer a false choice when trying to 
manipulate someone into committing to a sale (for example: see McMahon and Jamison 
(1989, pp 118, 119) or any high pressure sales manual that discusses ‘closing’ the sale).  The 
sales person does not explicitly articulate that the choices offered are the only choices, but the 
person interpreting the choices often interprets the alternatives as the only viable alternatives 
(Fearnside and Holther, 1959).   
Consideration of the false choice fallacy has relevance for experiment design as resource 
constraints force researchers into making tradeoffs in selecting alternatives to compare.  If 
alternatives do not reflect the range of available alternative, the findings from the research are 
at best biased and at worst, misleading. 
9False choice and theorising incentives 
We suggest that the development of a typology of alternatives is a potential solution to reduce 
the level of bias introduced in the selection of alternatives in experimental research.  There 
are a number of reasons for this.  By articulating all available alternatives, the researcher (and 
the reader) is consciously aware of and can make explicit tradeoffs between alternatives.  The 
limits to generalizability are then more apparent.  By articulating those alternatives that are 
mutually exclusive or continuous, alternatives can be framed in the appropriate context.  
Thereby, tradeoffs that are actually tradeoffs are explicitly recognised.   
The development of a typology of incentives has another practical advantage.  As the body of 
evidence amasses around the typology, a general theory can be proposed based on empirical 
evidence.  This would be especially useful in the area of incentives, due to the complex web 
of extant research.  Theories that are not able to be generalized would be more apparent, and 
related contextual factors would be easier to articulate.  Chiang and Birtch (2005, 2006) 
provide such a typology.  They draw a dichotomous relation between group and individual 
based reward allocation (see figure one).  This is consistent with prior literature that identifies 
a dichotomous relation between individual and group compensation schemes (London and 
Oldham, 1977; Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1995; Keating, 1997; Rankin, 2004; Brown 
et al, 2007).  Group and individual compensation are dichotomous, with many observed 
combinations of compensation schemes sitting at either end of, or on a continuum between 
these two extremes (Welbourne and Gomez Mejia, 1995; Brown et al, 2008).   
<INSERT FIGURE 1> 
As Drake et al (1999) identifies group compensation and tournaments as alternatives, the 
question is raise as to which incentive scheme results in the greatest performance; group, 
individual or tournament.  As discussed below, as tournaments are not observed in practice as 
alternatives, comparison between individual and group compensation schemes has more 
10 
relevance to practice.9  The following section considers the role of incentives to firm 
performance. 
Incentives and Organisations 
Incentive structures are relevant to organisation design and performance across all levels of 
the firm.  A number of perspectives in the economics and management literature propose that 
unless incentives are managed appropriately, firm performance may suffer (Donaldson, 2001; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 1992; Wright, 2005; Brown et al, 2008).  The relevance of 
incentive structures is evidenced also by the importance places upon incentives across 
different theories used to understand firms.  The firm has been understood by considering 
incentives from the perspective of participative management, expectancy theory, need theory, 
operant conditioning, social dilemma, equity theory, structure factors, contingency theory, 
social theory, agency theory and prospect theory (Welbourne and Gomez Mejia, 1995).  All 
of these theories consider incentives important in understanding the firm and firm 
performance. 
The theory base utilised in understanding how incentives relate to performance has been 
informed by case studies where people within firms have explicitly expressed the relevance 
of incentives and rewards (Welbourne and Gomez Mejia, 1995).  Further, the focus on 
incentives and rewards is a large part of management education (Robbins, Bergman and 
Stagg, 1997; Clegg Kornberger and Pitsis, 2005; Langfield-Smith, Thorne and Hilton, 2006), 
creating a feedback loop that some may consider as interactive.10  Therefore, an 
understanding of different incentive structures is important when designing firm and task 
structure, corporate governance and human resource decisions.  The penalties for inefficient 
incentive structures in organisations include poor performance due to moral hazard, adverse 
                                                          
9 Another dichotomy is between tournament and compensation based on equity theory (Main, O’Reilly and 
Wade, 1993; Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001 and Carpenter and Sanders, 2004).  The difference between 
these is the extent to which compensation levels differ between workers.  Under equity theory compensation is 
maintained at levels relatively similar between workers to preserve equity, thereby focusing on similarity.  At 
the other extreme, large differences between worker compensation levels are exploited to encourage increased 
work effort to attain higher relative performance.  Although theoretically it is evident how these contrast with 
each other, empirically it is not immediately apparent as to the extent these diametric opposites are explicitly 
considered by managers when constructing compensation contracts.   
10 Practice informing theory and theory informing practice. 
11 
selection of performance measures, and employee cognitive dissonance among other costs.  
Compensation schemes are one incentive mechanism that has received considerable attention 
in organization research. 
Compensation and Incentives 
The relation between incentives and compensation is one of the most researched topics in the 
management literature.  The literature has identified many different types of compensation 
schemes, making it difficult to compare and synthesise the literature.  These different types of 
compensation schemes include individual versus group reward systems, budget versus 
subjective based bonuses, long versus short term incentive schemes to mention a few.  In an 
effort to synthesis and position their research, Chiang and Birtch (2005, 2006) have 
developed a typology or Type-System-Criterion (TSC) framework that explicitly considers 
the dichotomous relation between individual versus group reward systems (see figure one). 
Below we consider the theory base of this dichotomy. 
According to Chaing and Birtch (2005, 2006), rewards and in turn incentives, can be 
allocated based either on a group or individual basis (refer to figure one).11   An incentive 
structure is classified as individual when the reward is allocated based on individual merit 
and classified as group incentive when the reward is received contingent on satisfying a 
common goal (Drake et al, 1999; Welbourne and Gomez Mejia, 1995; Brown et al, 2008).  
This is a dichotomous relation, with incentive packages sitting on a continuum between the 
extremes of group or individual based compensation (Brown et al, 2008).  Where only one 
performance measure is used to allocate performance based incentives, there may be a clear 
trade off between measures based on group performance and measures base on individual 
performance.  For example, choosing between an individual piece rate or a profit share 
scheme.  Alternatively, incentive compensation can be allocated based on a package of 
performance measures where there is an implicit trade off between group and individual 
compensation (Brown et al, 2008).  For example, offering both piece rate and profit share 
                                                          
11 This is consistent with prior literature that identifies a dichotomous relation between individual and group 
compensation schemes (London and Oldham, 1977; Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1995; Keating, 1997; 
Rankin, 2004; Brown et al, 2008).   
12 
compensation.  The question becomes, what proportion of individual versus group based 
rewards provides the incentives sought by the compensation package. 
Within traditional economic theories such as agency theory there is a focus on incentive 
structures that emphasise individual performance measures, which often results in 
competition between employees (Che and Yoo, 2001; Brown et al, 2008).  For example, in 
agency theory there is an assumption that employees act in their own self-interest and that 
incentives are provided to motivate employees to exert effort on activities that benefit the 
firm, rather than exert effort on activities that benefit themselves (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  A simple example of an incentive structure which emphasizes self-interest is an 
individual piece rate incentive (Cadsby et al, 2007), where a worker’s reward is related to 
individual output in the current period (Lazear, 1986).12  Piece rate compensation can be an 
effective incentive because it rewards employees who exert more effort, while identifying 
those employees who are not (Lazear, 1986).  
The extent to which competition is induced between employees under a piece rate plan is 
related to the second point, the identification of the relative performance of employees.  By 
combining individual compensation and relative performance information, management can 
induce competition between employees.  Tournament incentives, as used by Drake et al
(1999), can also be classified as individual because rewards are distributed contingent on 
individual performance, albeit relative to others (Brown et al, 2008).  Tournament incentives 
however differ to individual piece rate incentives because rank order tournaments explicitly 
promote competitive behavior amongst employees.  Lee et al (2005) outlines the main 
elements of tournament theory: (i) Players are rewarded with prizes based upon relative 
performance (ii) rewards are intrinsically nonlinear; (iii) the spread in prizes increases with 
the number of the competitors; (iv) participants with low ability will choose higher risk 
strategies to increase the probability of winning; and (v) the disincentive effects of mixed 
tournaments can be reduced by handicapping the more able players or by sorting players into 
tournaments of homogenous ability (Lee et al, 2005).   
                                                          
12 This can be compared to the fixed salary component of compensation, where the workers’ pay is independent 
of the current period’s output (Lazear 1986).  
13 
In practice, the most common form of a tournament incentive occurs when rewards are 
indivisible (Drake et al, 1999), for example, in the case of a promotion tournament.  In this 
case, only one worker out of many competing candidates may receive the promotion.  
Promotion falls under the non-financial reward type, however tournament incentives can also 
be provided under the financial reward type (for example, a cash bonus might be provided to 
the highest performing worker).  The impact of culture on tournament incentives will not be 
tested here as the associated actions and behaviors are more like to be related to non-cultural 
factors (Sutherland, 1987). 
Alternatively, the use of group compensation schemes has been observed across all levels of 
the organization, from low skilled workers, divisional managers and senior executives 
(Welbourne and Gomez Mejia, 1995; Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1995; Brown et al, 
2008).  Group compensation is where there are interdependencies in performance 
measurement between different people, with a focus on common incentives (Brown et al, 
2008).  For example, in the manufacturing industry, workers have been compensated using a 
bonus pool related to the number of total units produced, total cost savings or value added 
activities across the business unit (Welbourne and Gomez Mejia, 1995).  Although a review 
of the literature finds support for the general proposition that group compensation increases 
employee involvement and in turn productivity gains in the manufacturing sector, how group 
compensation operates at the micro level is not well understood (Welbourne and Gomez 
Mejia, 1995).  This is in part because case studies and surveys are often cross sectional, 
making causal linkages difficult to determine (Ibid).  
The above discussion suggests that group compensation may not necessarily be more 
efficient than individual compensation in an information rich environment (Brown et al, 
2008).  Also, the above section suggests that there is a trade off between group and individual 
incentives and that they are alternative compensation schemes in motivating employees to 
work harder (albeit, with different incentives).  Given that tournament incentives may not be 
a direct alternative to group compensation, the findings from Drake et al (1999) lose some 
generalizability.  This is because they have compared alternatives that are alternatives in 
theory, not practice; instead of choosing alternatives that are actual alternatives faced by 
managers.  Therefore, it is not apparent as to whether Drake et al’s (1999) findings are 
generalizable, other than to say that highly competitive compensation may be inefficient.  
The following section discusses evidence from theories of national culture that suggest 
14 
individual compensation is preferable to group compensation for the U.S. and other countries 
in the Anglo cluster.  
Cultural and Economic Underpinnings of Incentive Structures in Anglo Countries 
It is difficult to develop incentive theory without explicitly considering the cultural 
underpinnings of existing incentive theories.13  A number of studies, predominantly in the 
management (Huo and Steers, 1993; Kowtha and Leng, 1999; Johnson and Droege, 2004; 
Chiang and Birtch, 2006) and psychology (Chen et al, 1997) literature have examined the 
cultural underpinnings of incentive structures.  In the accounting and economics literature 
there is a substantial body of research on incentives (Gibbons, 1998; Prendergast, 1999; Che 
and Yoo, 2001; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002) however there has been little consideration of 
national culture.  While not looking specifically at incentives, a number of accounting studies 
have highlighted the importance of national culture in accounting research (Gray, 1988; 
Harrison, 1993: Brewer, 1998; Chow et al, 2000; Hope, 2003; Lanis and McFarling, 2004). 
Traditional economic theories such as agency theory implies that group incentives structures 
are not efficient there will be individuals in the group who free-ride (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Holmstrom, 1979, 1982; Brown et al, 2008).   Therefore, the use of a group incentive 
structure is a departure from one of the fundamental assumptions of agency theory (rational 
self interest) (Che and Yoo, 2001).  Johnson and Droege (2004) suggest that this departure 
may be due to agency theory paying little attention to the “co-operative aspects of social life”, 
a notion which is important in group incentives structures. In contrast, individual incentive 
structures, which are more consistent with the assumptions of agency theory, do not explicitly 
encourage co-operation (Hansen, 1997; Che and Yoo, 2001).  The lack of incentives to co-
operate may be problematic for tasks where co-operation is desirable (Brown et al, 2008).  
Individual incentive structures are consistent with the assumptions of agency theory that 
goals, rational self-interest and risk preferences diverge between employers and employees, 
with individual incentives designed to promote effort and discourage shirking (Holmstrom, 
1979; Johnson and Droege, 2004).  These assumptions are supported by empirical evidence 
                                                          
13 We take a very broad view of theory here, meaning any proposition that links more than one object together. 
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and they are deeply rooted in Anglo value systems, with most of this evidence based on 
samples taken from Anglo cultures (e.g. Stroh et al, 1996; Ghosh and John, 2000). 
Consistent with the above proposition that culture has influenced theories of the firm, a 
number of studies have considered whether different cultures have different preferences for 
different compensation schemes (Kim et al, 1990; Chiang and Birtch, 2005).  As different 
cultures are proposed to have different preferences for incentive systems, researchers have 
considered whether these different preferences lead to different behaviors.  For example, 
Chow, Shields and Wu (1999) propose that cultural individualism versus collectivism 
moderates the relation between task and incentive independencies.  Although they claim that 
national culture is an omitted variable in management control system literature, they fail to 
provide conclusive evidence supporting their proposition.  The question of whether and how 
national culture influences the effectiveness of different incentive schemes has not been 
resolved and is discussed below. 
National culture 
The topic of culture has stimulated epic debate in the management literature.  On the one 
hand, national culture is defined as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from another” and is considered to be 
relatively stable over time (Hofstede, 1980 p 25).14  On the other hand, some theorists argue 
that culture is ephemeral and impossible to quantify, with effort to quantify culture seen as an 
attempt of various groups in society to dominate, rather than reflections of an objective 
reality (Clegg et al, 2005).  The relative merit of this debate for this study can be assessed by 
considering how the dominant theoretical framework of national culture has been 
constructed. 
The theoretical framework for national culture utilised in this paper is based on Hofstede’s 
(1980) work where he identified four dimensions (societal values) of national culture (a fifth 
                                                          
14 Similarly, Rohner (1984) defines national culture as ‘a system of meanings in the heads of multiple 
individuals within a population’. 
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dimension was subsequently added). In order to quantify a set of ‘work-related values’,15
Hofstede surveyed a sample of 116,000 workers from IBM subsidiaries in 40 countries.16
These workers appeared to be identically matched in their working environment except for 
their nationality. Statistical analysis of the IBM data revealed four ‘societal values’ which 
Hofstede termed ‘dimensions of culture’. Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions are 
individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, uncertainty avoidance and power distance 
(see table one for a summary of these dimensions). 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture have been used as a theoretical framework in a 
significant portion of the extant cross-cultural research (Kirkman et al, 2006; Ng et al, 2007). 
Hofstede’s dimensions are also considered to be the dominant theoretical framework in cross-
cultural accounting research.  For example, Gray (1988) developed a framework for the 
influence of culture on accounting based on Hofstede’s four initial dimensions of national 
culture.17 A number of studies have tested Gray’s framework and found that culture is an 
important factor in the specific areas of disclosure (Zarzeski, 1996; Hope, 2003) and actual 
financial reporting practices (Salter and Niswander, 1995).18  For an example in the area of 
management control systems, see Harrison and McKinnon (2002). 
Despite frequent use both generally and in the accounting literature, Hofstede’s dimensions 
of national culture have attracted a number of criticisms. One such critique is that Hofstede 
reduces culture to an overly simplistic five dimension conceptualisation (Sivakumar and 
Nakata, 2001; Baskerville-Morely, 2005; Kirkman et al, 2006). Another critique is that 
nations are not the best units for studying culture (Baskerville-Morely, 2005). This is 
acknowledged by Hofstede (2002) himself; however he argues that nations are the only kinds 
of units that can be used to enable comparison. However, it must be noted that Hofstede’s 
                                                          
15 Hofstede (1980) views ‘work related values’ as core cultural values. This term is used interchangeably with 
‘societal values’.  
16 Hofstede (1983) later added 10 more countries and three regions to his original framework.  
17 The accounting values identified by Gray (1988) include professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity 
versus flexibility, and conservatism versus optimism and secrecy versus transparency.   
18 Using data from 29 countries, Salter & Niswander (1995) found that Gray’s model has statistically significant 
explanatory power when used to explain actual financial reporting practices.   
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dimensions have been empirically supported at both the individual and organisational levels 
of analysis (Kirkman et al, 2006). 
Additionally, Hofstede’s framework has been criticised for: limiting the sample to a single 
multinational corporation (IBM); failing to capture changes in culture over time; and ignoring 
within-country cultural differences (Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001).  Despite these criticisms, 
Hofstede’s framework has remained favoured by researchers due to its “clarity, parsimony 
and resonance with managers” (Kirkman et al, 2006).  Hofstede’s dimensions are thus 
utilised in this study for four main reasons. Firstly, this study is not aiming to identify 
additional dimensions, but test the strength of Hofstede’s dimensions in the area of 
incentives.  Secondly, the incentive structure classifications of individual and group closely 
correspond with Hofstede’s national culture dimension of individualism/collectivism.  Third, 
an alternative theoretical framework has not been developed to supersede Hofstede.  Four, 
although dimensions of culture are not necessarily predictive of individuals values, this is not 
the interest in our study.  We are concerned with average values and dimensions of culture 
provide this.19
Hofstede (1980) labelled his factors cultural dimensions, each purported to represent a 
universal descriptive characteristic of a society (see table one for a summary of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions).  Evidence from Hofstede (1991, p. 53) indicates that the countries with 
the highest IDV values (individualists) are Anglo countries including the United States, 
Australia, United Kingdom and Canada. In these countries, individual achievement is highly 
valued and rewarded (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004). Consistent with agency theory, Hofstede 
(1991) suggests that in individualist societies it is expected that workers will act according to 
their own self-interest and work should be organised in such a way that aligns their interests 
with that of the firm. Therefore, incentive structures that are classified as individual, such as 
piece rate incentives, would be preferred by workers in an Anglo setting.  
In addition, Anglo countries are classified as having an internal locus of control which is 
(high individualism and low power distance). Therefore, according to Chiang and Birch 
                                                          
19 By construction, more than fifty percent of the population share the value attribute.   
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(2005) “. . . they prefer rewards that are based on their behaviour (Miceli and Lane, 1991; 
Cable and Judge, 1994).”  Complementing that suggestion is that Anglo countries are 
Masculine and relatively low on the Uncertainty Avoidance (Newman and Nollen, 1996; 
Beer and Katz, 1998), characteristics that align with individualism. 
Tosi and Greckhamer (2004) found a positive relationship between the level of individualism 
in a society and CEO compensation, in particular the total and variable components. They 
suggest that this may be a result of the compensation schemes of firms in individualistic 
countries having greater performance risk being transferred to CEO’s. Thus, compensation 
schemes in individualistic cultures are likely to have individual characteristics. 
Newman and Nollen (1996) provide evidence which suggests that when management 
practices ‘fit’ better with the national culture, higher (financial) performance is observed in 
comparison to a situation where the fit is not as good. Therefore, when an incentive structure 
‘fits’ with an individual’s cultural values, higher performance should be observed when 
compared to an individual that has been given an incentive structure that does not ‘fit’ with 
their respective cultural values. 
Hofstede (1991) suggests that incentives or bonuses which are linked to an individual’s 
performance are more appropriate to a person’s skill set and routines in an individualist 
society relative to a collectivist society. Thus, in an individualist society an individual 
incentive structure would allow the employee to pursue their own self-interest by exerting 
maximum effort on activities that will benefit both him or herself and the firm.  Against that 
background we restate the Drake et al (1999) hypothesis given the cultural values and the 
prevailing economic theory in the Anglo countries and using an individual compensation 
scheme as a proxy for individual compensation.  
The discussion reveals a tension between society wide values of individualism and the 
explicit incentives induced by reward systems within the context of the task.  Given a task 
where there are significant gains from both individual and group innovations that increase 
each participant’s payoff, there is no reason to expect any difference in the number of 
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individual or group innovations under either group or individual compensation scheme if 
under both schemes.20 Individualistic preferences (or cultural values) provide an incentive to 
engage in individual or group innovations that promote the individuals welfare, regardless of 
the incentive scheme in place.  Therefore, if the task structure allows for group innovation to 
increase individual payoffs, participants have an incentive to engage in group innovations to 
the extent that those innovations increase their payoff.  Therefore, we propose H1, that the 
incentive will have little impact on the number of cooperative or individual innovations in a 
task where both individual and group innovations promote the welfare of individuals. 
Hence we restate Drake et al (1999) hypotheses  as follows: 
H1a: The incentive structure has little effect on the number of cooperative innovations 
undertaken such that: 
COOP abc,grp = COOP abc,ind
H1b: The incentive structure has little effect on the number of individual innovations 
undertaken such that: 
IND abc,grp  = IND abc,ind
According to Drake et al (1999), efficiency and profitability were higher when a group 
incentive structure was used21  (in combination with an activity based costing system22).
However, the above discussion which related to the societal values prevalent in Anglo 
countries and of agency theory suggests that workers in an Anglo country will exert more 
effort given an individual compensation scheme and hence achieve greater corporate 
                                                          
20 If there were significant gains from group innovations that did not benefit some of the individuals involved 
under an individual compensation scheme, then the group compensation scheme would likely be more efficient 
as it would encourage participants to engage in group innovations (Brown et al, 2008).  However, in the context 
of Drake et al’s (1999) experiment, individuals do benefit from group innovations through reduced cost and 
increased efficiencies.   
21 This is supported by Hofstede (1991 p. 63) who indicates that “if the work group functions as emotional 
ingroup, incentives and bonuses should be given to the group, not to individuals.” It is also supported by Huo 
and Steers (1993) who proposed the higher the ‘degree of team spirit’, group based incentives will be more 
effective than individual based ones in motivating workers. 
22 Like Drake et al (1999), group incentives are be studied in an information rich activity based costing context.  
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efficiency and profitability.  Second, Brown et al (2008) suggest that in information rich 
environments, where inputs and outputs of a process are readily observable, individual 
compensation will be more efficient as there is a tighter nexus between effort and reward.  On 
the other hand, for the benefits of group compensation to outweigh the costs associated with 
such a plan, there needs to be significant gains from co-operation, co-ordination and 
information sharing that do not benefit some of the individuals involved under an individual 
compensation scheme (Brown et al, 2008).23  However, in the context of Drake et al’s (1999) 
experiment, individuals do benefit from group innovations through reduced cost and 
increased efficiencies.  However, it is apparent that with more effort, the level of activity will 
drive plant profit higher.  Therefore, with culturally individualistic participants and a task 
without explicit gains from co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing we propose 
H2.  Hence we restate Drake et al (1999) hypotheses as follows:  
H2: The incentive structure has an effect on plant profit (PROFIT) such that: 
PROFIT abc,grp < PROFIT abc,ind
We expect each hypothesis to hold irrespective of the costing system.  Therefore, we do not 
include volume based costing (VBC) in the analysis.  In addition according to Drake et al. 
(1999), the greatest difference between innovations, efficiency and profitability, given a 
particular compensation scheme, relates to Activity Based Costing (ABC). 
3 Research Design
In order to test the above hypotheses, the research design needs to compare differences in 
behaviour between groups drawn from a culturally individualistic population given either 
group or individual incentive structures.  The number of individual and group innovations as 
well as task performance needs to be measured, whilst remaining consistent with Drake et al 
(1999).  In order to satisfy the above conditions, the experimental design is based on the 
                                                          
23 The structure of Drake et al’s (1999) information rich (ABC) task does not allow for manipulation of 
these variables making the relative efficiency of group compensation difficult to conclusively target.   
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simulated production task initially performed by Drake et al (1999) and subsequently used by 
Wynder (2004).25
Under the individual incentive structure, incentive compensation was determined using an 
individual profitability scheme and the group incentive was a group pooling of profits.  The 
individual profitability scheme is not dissimilar to piece rate, whereby the worker is 
compensation based on their output in the current period.  Traditionally, under a piece rate 
scheme, output is measured by the number of units produced by the worker. However, this 
was not considered appropriate in this task because it would result workers disregarding any 
form of cost reduction. Hence, an individual profitability scheme was used, which took into 
account both output (number of units produced) and associated costs for each individual.26
Under the group incentive structure, a group pooling of profits scheme was used to allocate 
incentive compensation, whereby each individual’s profitability was summed and divided 
equally between all team members.  All subjects were given a financial incentive to 
participate in the experiment and increase their motivation while performing the task. 
Subjects received a gift voucher valued between ten and twenty dollars for participating in 
the experiment, with the final amount being contingent upon performance in the task.27  The 
gift voucher was emailed to subjects following completion of the experimental task. 
Performance is the dependent variable and is measured using each team’s total profitability, 
as this is the primary goal of any profit-making organisation.28  In the treatment groups where 
the incentive structure ‘fits’ with the respective cultural values, higher performance are 
expected to be observed when compared to the treatment groups that have been given an 
incentive structure that does not ‘fit’ with the respective cultural values (Newman and Nollen, 
1996).  The DHR experiment had three types of independent variable: innovation, productive 
efficiency and profitability. This study utilises two of these.  Efficiency is excluded as it is 
                                                          
25 For the remainder of this section, the Drake et al (1999) experiment will be referred to as the ‘DHR 
experiment’.  
26 Drake et al (1999) used a different type of individual incentive structure, a rank order tournament scheme. 
27 The use of gift vouchers as a financial incentive is consistent with prior research (Booth and Schulz, 2004; 
White, 2007). 
28 During the experiment, data was collected to allow sensitivity testing of three alternative dependent variables: 
individual innovations, group innovations and efficiency (cost per unit). 
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captured in profitability (the hypotheses two test was replicated using the DHR measure of 
efficiency with the same result as using profitability). 
The DHR experiment examines process innovation in work teams and classifies innovations
as either individual or co-operative.  Co-operative innovations require the coordination of at 
least two team members, whilst one person can carry out an individual innovation.  An 
example of a group innovation is where participants change the order of production or share 
work areas.  An example of an individual innovation is where participants carry more than on 
work-in in progress from the warehouse to their work area or if they work on more than one 
unit at a time.  DHR proposed that higher performance will be achieved by a high number of 
innovations. 
While the task itself remains fundamentally the same to the one used in the DHR experiment, 
this experiment differs to the DHR study in a number of ways.  These differences have a 
number of implications for the proposed experiment.  First, the DHR experiment used a 2x3 
factorial design while this study utilises a 2x2 factorial design. The DHR treatment groups 
included two incentives structures (GRP and Tournament), two costing systems (activity-
based and volume -based) and a period effect.  This study includes only one costing system 
and two incentives structures (GRP and IND) and a period effect.  Tournament incentives and 
volume based costing are not necessary for testing of the hypothesis.  Therefore, given 
resource constraints, they are not included as part of this study.  Also, in the DHR study, the 
most extreme differences between the incentive structures were observed when treatment 
groups were given the ABC information as opposed to the VBC information.  In this study, 
the costing system is not relevant.  Therefore, all treatment groups will be given ABC 
information, reflecting an information-rich environment.   
Second, Drake et al (1999) collected the number of group innovations on an individual basis, 
whereases we have collected the number of group innovations on a group basis.  The reason 
for this choice was to reduce the amount of information recorded during the limited 
experiment period to reduce errors of omission.  Therefore, the number of group innovations 
figure is not directly comparable to Drake et al (1999). 
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Sample 
A total of 66 subjects participated in the experiment, which gives the same level of statistical 
power as the Drake et al (1999).29 Subjects were recruited from business subjects at an 
Australian university.  The total sample included 66 students born and educated (up to high 
school) in Australia. The characteristics of the sample are summarised in Table 2. The sample 
consisted primarily of female subjects, with females accounting for 59% of the total sample 
(compared to 41% for males).  The mean age of participants is 19.86 years.  Most participants 
had had some prior team work experience with 89% of participants having prior team 
experience in an educational environment and 82% in a work environment.  
<INSERT TABLE 2> 
As culture is one of the independent variables, the subjects were carefully screened to ensure 
they were not international students.  Development psychologists advocate that by the age of 
10, most children have their basic value systems in place (Hofstede, 1991).  Hofstede 
suggests that because the values were acquired at such a young age, these values often remain 
‘unconscious’ to those who hold them. Consequently, any changes in values after the age of 
10 are difficult to make (Hofstede, 1991). Therefore, in order to be eligible for the Australian 
treatment group, subjects were screened to ensure that they were born and completed high 
school in Australia in order to increase the likelihood that their basic value system was rooted 
in Australian culture.  Any subject that did not meet the eligibility criteria was discarded from 
the sample. After eligibility was confirmed, subjects were randomly contacted and allocated 
to a timeslot for the experiment based on their availability.  Contact methods included voice 
calls, text messages and email. 
                                                          
29 This sample size is also consistent with Booth & Schultz (2004), who used 131 subjects in a 2x2 factorial 
design laboratory experiment.   
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Experiment Task Description 
The task required subjects, in groups of three, to assemble a product from LEGOTM blocks. 
Each experiment was conducted in a university classroom which had the necessary 
audiovisual and furniture required for the task. The experimental setting was organised like a 
production ‘plant’, with three work areas (for each participant) and a ‘warehouse’ (refer to 
Figure 2). The product was made in three separate stages (refer to Figure 3), with each 
worker completing and adding a sub-assembly made with LEGOTM blocks of three different 
colours (blue, red or yellow).  
<INSERT FIGURE 2> 
<INSERT FIGURE 3> 
Present in the room with the three subjects was a ‘quality control inspector’ (QCI) and a 
‘quality control assistant’ (QCA). Upon arrival to the room, subjects were randomly allocated 
a name tag which identified them as either the blue, red or yellow assembler. They were then 
presented with worker information sheets which contained the instructions for the task. These 
instructions were also presented to the subjects in the form of an instructional video, which 
ensured that all subjects were presented with the information in an identical manner. There 
were two variations of the worker information sheets and instructional video, one for each 
treatment group (individual and group compensation). 
The task instructions presented in the worker information sheet and the instructional video 
were based on those used in Drake et al (1999, 2001). Changes were not made to the task; 
however the instructions were presented differently.  The materials were first prepared and 
pilot tested on two Australian teams (one group and one individual compensation group).  
After pilot testing, adjustments were made to ensure the instructions were as clear as possible.  
Further pilot testing (another two Australian teams, one group and one individual 
compensation group) was conducted and confirmed that the instructions were satisfactory.  
The results for these four pilot groups were not included in the final sample and results.  
The worker information sheet and instructional video consisted of four sections: i) 
manufacturing process ii) plant operation and rules iii) revenues and costs and iv) 
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compensation. The subjects were told that they were working for a manufacturing company 
called ‘Block Limited’.  
In the first section, after receiving instructions about the current manufacturing process of 
Block Limited, subjects were asked to physically demonstrate (one at a time) the production 
process. The QCI observed the demonstration and corrected the assemblers on mistakes (if 
any) to ensure that all three subjects were competent at building the LEGO product.  
In the second section, the subjects were informed of the operating procedures and rules of 
Block Limited. At the start of each production period, there are three completed blue 
assemblies and three completed red assemblies in the warehouse so that the red and yellow 
assemblers can begin work at the start of the period. These do not count towards output or 
revenue at the end of the production period. At the end of each period, the QCI examines 
assemblies to ensure they have been completed correctly. The plant rules are outlined in 
Figure 4.
<INSERT FIGURE 4> 
In the third section, the revenues and expenses associated with production was explained to 
the subjects. Each completed assembly (blue, red or yellow) was worth $1.00 in sales 
revenue. Hence, each finished good (which contained a completed blue, red and yellow 
assembly) was worth $3.00 in sales revenue for Block Limited. There were three production 
costs. The warehouse storage cost was $1.00 per storage bin used, the work area charge was 
$2.00 per work area used and the inventory holding cost was $0.50 per unused or incomplete 
assembly. An assembly was classified as unused if it was a completed blue or red assembly 
that had not yet been processed by the red or yellow assemblers at the end of the production 
period. For example, if the blue assembler had a completed blue assembly in the warehouse 
at the end of the production period and it had not been used by the red or yellow assemblers, 
then the blue assembler would be charged an inventory holding cost of $0.50 for that 
assembly. An incomplete assembly was any assembly that had been started but not completed 
at the end of the production period. In relation to the previous example, if the red assembler 
had started production on the completed blue assembly then the red assembler would be 
charged the inventory holding cost of $0.50.  
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The instructions in sections 1-3 were identical for all treatment groups, with the only 
difference being the instructions given to subjects in section 4 differed for the individual and 
group incentive treatments.  All treatment groups were given a compensation scheme that 
consisted of a fixed component of $10 and a variable component of up to $10, paid out as gift 
vouchers.  The variable component of compensation was a performance-based incentive 
scheme, with compensation being allocated differently in the individual and group treatment 
groups.  Teams that were given an individual incentive structure were advised that their 
variable compensation is based on their individual profitability. Figure 5, Panel A is an 
example of how variable compensation is calculated under the individual structure. Those 
teams that were given a group incentive structure were directed that their variable 
compensation based on team profitability. Figure 5, Panel B shows that variable 
compensation is shared equally between all team members.  
After receiving all the task instructions, the subjects were given five true or false 
comprehension questions to answer.  These questions were designed to enhance student’s 
understanding of sections 3 and 4 and were self-corrected by each subject.  If any of the 
questions were answered incorrectly, subjects were given time to review their worker 
information sheets.   
<INSERT FIGURE 5> 
The subjects then began the first of four ‘production periods’ with three designated breaks in 
between these periods.30  Each production period went for two minutes, with the subjects 
unaware of both the number and length of production periods to reduce endgame strategies.  
During each production period, both the quality control inspector and the quality control 
assistant observed and recorded any innovations that the subjects performed.  During the 
designated break, both the QCI and QCA physically counted the number of assemblies that 
were completed by the work group.  When finished counting, the figures of both the QCI and 
QCA were compared. If there were any discrepancies a second count of the assemblies took 
                                                          
30 At the end of the first production period (and the beginning of the first break), the subjects were informed that 
it was a practice period and any compensation earned did not count towards their final compensation amount.  
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place to ensure no counting errors were made.  The QCI then prepared each assemblers 
‘compensation worksheet’ while the QCA returned the plant to its original condition.  While 
the subjects were reviewing their compensation sheets, the QCI and QCA reconciled their 
innovation recording sheets to ensure there was consensus in relation to the innovations 
performed.  After the fourth production period, the subjects were informed that it was the last 
work period.  
Finally, a questionnaire was given to each subject to complete after the final production 
period. The data from this questionnaire was used to for sensitivity testing. The questionnaire 
consisted of four sections: 1) demographic information; 2) task-related information (including 
two manipulation checks); and 3) Schwartz’s Value Survey (SVS).  Demographic 
information including gender, age, religion, ethnicity and political views were collected.  The 
task requires subjects to work in teams; therefore subjects were asked whether they had 
previous exposure to a teamwork environment (either in paid employment or as part of an 
educational environment). Subjects were also asked to disclose whether they knew any of the 
other assemblers, quality control inspector or quality control assistant.  The manipulation 
check questions are discussed in more detail below. Due to the possibility that personal 
values may influence an individual’s performance under a given incentive structure 
(Harrison, 1993), subjects were asked to complete a values questionnaire, being Schwartz’s 
competing values survey.  
Manipulation Checks 
The final questionnaire included two manipulation check questions. Overall, 96% of the 66 
subjects got at least one of these questions correct.  Both questions were multiple choice, with 
the first having two alternatives and the second having seven alternatives. The first 
manipulation check question simply asked subjects to identify whether the variable 
compensation scheme that they were given was based individual output or group 
performance.  The second question described a task-related scenario, and then asked students 
to identify how much compensation they would have received in the experimental task.  
The results presented below include students who failed one or more of the manipulation 
checks.  Robustness testing shows that the statistical results present in the next section are not 
significantly different after controlling for subjects who either 1) did not answer any 
manipulation checks correctly 2) answered question one correctly but not question two 3) 
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answered question two correctly but not question one 4) answered at least one manipulation 
check question correctly or 5) answered both manipulation checks correctly.  
Robustness testing 
Participants were randomly assigned to treatment groups, therefore it is not necessary to 
control for individual differences between participants.  However, to ensure that the results 
are robust to the potential of other factors driving the results, potential covariates are added to 
both an OLS and stepwise regression model.  The task requires subjects to work in teams, 
therefore previous exposure to a teamwork environment (either in paid employment or as part 
of tertiary studies) is included as a covariate.  As Australia is a relatively young and 
multicultural country, ethnicity is also controlled for.  Demographic information including 
gender and age was also collected.  Due to the possibility that personal values may influence 
an individual’s performance under a given incentive structure (Harrison, 1993), Schwartz’s 
competing values survey (Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995) are used to control for differences in 
personality.  Robustness testing reveals that no control factor is associated with the 
independent variables.  The results of robustness testing are not reported (the personal values 
are yet to be tested.  Results are forthcoming).   
4 Results and discussion
In order to test the research hypotheses Analysis of Variance was used on the data presented 
in table three. In consistency with Drake et al (1999), team outcomes were used as the unit of 
analysis.   
<INSERT TABLE 3> 
Table three presents the means of the dependent variables by experimental condition for each 
period.  A simple visual analysis of the means indicates that profitability is higher given an 
individual compensation scheme than group, which is the opposite of Drake et al (1999).  A 
rudimentary visual analysis of the data suggests that all the hypotheses cannot be rejected as 
the difference in the number of innovations appears to be minimal. 
<INSERT FIGURE 6> 
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Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
A two-factor mixed-design ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis and is presented in table 
four. The dependent variables are either the total number of individual innovations per team, 
the number of group innovations per team or team profitability.  The two independent 
variables (factors) are incentive (manipulation) and period (control).  Incentive has two 
between subject conditions, individual and group compensation.  Period is a repeated 
measures factor with three within subject conditions, being period two, period three and 
period four.  The data was analysed using SPSS statistical software at an alpha level of 0.05.  
The ANOVA will test whether there is a significant difference in profitability between the 
two incentive treatments after controlling for period.   
<INSERT TABLE 4> 
Cooperative Innovations 
Table 4 Panel A indicates that the mean number of group innovations is not significantly 
different, given either an individual or group compensation scheme.  In the ANOVA, the 
incentive variable has an insignificant main effect (F=0.081, p=0.779).  Thus, the incentive 
structure (individual or group) does not account for the between subject variance in the 
number of group innovations.  As the results are not significant, we are unable to reject H1A. 
The control variable period has a significant main effect on profitability (F=7.905, p = 0.004). 
The mean squares indicate that a substantial amount of within subject variation is due to 
period in comparison to error, indicating that period has a large effect. There is also a 
significant interaction between the period and incentive variables in the ANOVA (F=3.931, p 
=0.042). 
Individual Innovations 
Table 4 Panel B indicates that the mean number of innovations is not significantly different, 
given either an individual or group compensation scheme.  In the ANOVA, the incentive 
variable has an insignificant main effect (F=0.000, p=0.949).  Thus, the incentive structure 
(individual or group) does not account for the between subject variance in the number of 
individual innovations.  As the results are not significant, we are unable to reject H1B. 
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The control variable, period, does not have a significant main effect on profitability (F=0.200, 
p = 0.820).  The mean squares indicate that little within subject variation is due to period in 
comparison to error, indicating that period has no effect.  There is also a significant 
interaction between the period and incentive variables in the ANOVA (F=3.883, p =0.029). 
Profitability 
Table 4 Panel C indicates that the mean profit is significantly greater given an individual 
compensation scheme than group.  In the ANOVA, the incentive variable has a significant 
main effect (F=4.50, p=0.05) and the mean square for incentive (162.31) is much higher than 
the mean square for error (36.07). Thus, in Australia, the incentive structure (individual or 
group) accounts for a large proportion of the between subject variance in profitability, and 
this difference is significant.  As the above results are significant, we are unable to reject H2. 
The control variable period has a significant main effect on profitability (F=36.24, p = 0.001). 
The mean squares indicate that a substantial amount of within subject variation is due to 
period in comparison to error, indicating that period has a large effect. There is also a 
significant interaction between the period and incentive variables in the ANOVA (F=3.36, p 
=0.05). 
5 Conclusion and Limitations
The objective for this study was to consider the potential for false choice problems in 
experimental research.  We consider Drake et al’s (1999) experiment and entertain the 
potential for a false choice, reducing the generalizability of their findings.  Consideration of 
possible alternatives to group compensation using the typology developed by Chiang and 
Birtch (2005; 2006) suggested that individual compensation as a potentially better alternative 
that a rank order tournament.  Our theory development was informed by differences between 
the conclusions drawn from Drake et al (1999) and the propositions put forward by theories 
of national culture (given the societal value orientations of Anglo countries) and recent 
incentive studies (Brown et al, 2008).   
We replicate Drake et al’s (1999) simulated production task comparing group pooling of 
profits to an individual profit incentive scheme, instead of tournament.  Consistent with the 
theory development, the results obtained indicate that in an Anglo country setting, workers 
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perform better given an individual compensation scheme, relative to a group compensation 
scheme, in a task in an information rich environment without large gains from co-operation, 
co-ordination and information sharing.  This finding is consistent with Brown et al (2008).  
Further, irrespective of the incentive scheme incentive structure did not have a significant 
impact on the number of cooperative or individual innovations.  These results are consistent 
with the proposition that national culture impacts behaviour at the organisational level, and 
given an incentive scheme that is congruent with the prevailing societal values may improve 
organisational performance. 
The results presented are different to those presented in Drake et al (1999).  This is likely 
attributable to their assumption that tournament is representative of individualistic 
compensation.  The differences in commendations between the two studies illustrate the 
problems associated with a false choice bias.  Whereas Drake et al (1999) presented evidence 
that incentive schemes effect the performance of teams, this study presents evidence that 
given a similar task structure and cultural disposition, individual compensation schemes are 
to be preferred over group compensation in an information rich environment.  Further, this 
study shows that given Drake et al’s (1999) task structure, increased effort, not innovation, is 
the likely driver of performance.  This issue warrants further investigation. 
An experimental design was considered to be the most appropriate research method for this 
study for a number of reasons.  First, experiments are able to address important accounting 
issues for which archival data is unavailable or does not exist, as is the case here (Maines et 
al, 2006).  Second, the high internal and construct validity provided by experiments enables 
the researcher to isolate complicated concepts and examine their individual and interactive 
effects (Maines et al, 2006).  However, this places a greater burden on the researcher, and 
thus extreme care must be taken to ensure the experiment is designed and executed in such a 
way as to preserve this validity.  The experiment used in this study is almost identical to that 
used in Drake et al (1999) and Wynder (2004); therefore the experimental design is less of a 
concern.  However, the practical execution of the experiment if carried out incorrectly has the 
potential to bias the results.  
A limitation of this type of research is the ability to generalise from the sample population of 
university students to the workforce, which is a recurring issue in experimental research that 
uses students (Wynder, 2004).  However, the external validity sacrifice associated with using 
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undergraduate university students is “vastly overwhelmed by the strength or power to make 
causal statements which are brought about by internal validity” (Brownell, 1995 p.15).  
Another limitation is the bias introduced by the task structure.  As the literature suggests, task 
or organizational structure influences the relative efficiency of group versus individual 
compensation schemes (Bushman et al, 1995; Keating, 1997; Brown et al, 2008).  Further 
research manipulating the task structure may address this issue and increase the 
generalizability of the results.  Further limiting this study is that it was replicated in Australia, 
not in the US.  However, there is significant evidence that Australian societal values are 
similar to those in the US and hence that difference alone can’t explain the difference 
between the results obtained here and Drake et al. (1999). 
Future research could take incentives theory one step further and investigate the questions 
and hypotheses presented here in a cross cultural context by undertaking similar experiments 
in different countries and by improving the compensation typology.  The outcomes of such 
research may confirm the impact of culture on the relationship between incentive systems and 
organisational performance.    
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6.0 Tables and Figures
Figure 1 – Compensation Framework32
                                                          
32 Adapted from Chiang & Birtch’s (2005, 2006) type-system-criterion (TSC) framework for rewards.  
38 
Figure 2 – Plant Layout
Source: Drake et al (1999 pp. 330) 
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Figure 3 – Assembly Stages


















 BLUE RED YELLOW
REVENUE:  
NUMBEROFASSEMBLIESCOMPLETED 6 4 5
NUMBEROFASSEMBLIESCOMPLETEDX$1.00
=TOTALREVENUE $6.00 $4.00 $5.00
   
COSTS:   
WAREHOUSESTORAGE:
$1.00PERSTORAGEBINUSED $1.00 $1.00 $1.00
CHARGEPERWORKAREA:
$2.00PERWORKAREAUSED $2.00 $2.00 $2.00
INVENTORYHOLDINGCOSTS:
$0.50PERASSEMBLYINPROCESS $1.00 $1.00 $1.00



























































Table 1 – Dimensions of Cultural Values Identified by Hofstede33




Masculinity as a societal value stands for a preference in a society for 
achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success. Its opposite,
femininity as a societal value stands for a preference for relationships, 
modesty, caring for the weak, and quality of life. The fundamental feature 
addressed by this dimension is the way in which a society allocates social (as 
opposed to biological) roles to the sexes (Gray, 1988); 
UAI index (strong 
(high) versus weak 
(low) uncertainty 
avoidance)
Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. This feeling leads them to 
beliefs promising certainty and to maintaining institutions protecting 
conformity. Strong uncertainty avoidance as a societal value stands for the 
need to maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour, and intolerance of non-
conforming persons and ideas. Weak uncertainty avoidance as a societal value 
stands for a need to maintain a more relaxed atmosphere in which practice 
counts more than principles and deviance is tolerated. The fundamental 
feature addressed by this dimension is how a society reacts to the uncertainty 
of future events whether it tries to influence the future or passively let it 
happen (Gray, 1988).
PDI index (large 
(high) versus small 
(low) power distance)
Power distance is the extent to which members of a society accept that power 
in institutions and organisations is distributed unequally. Large power
distance as a societal value is indicative of individuals accepting a 
hierarchical order in which everybody has a place which needs no further 
justification. Small power distance as a societal value is indicative of striving 
for power equalisation and demand justification for power inequalities. The 
fundamental feature addressed by this dimension is how a society treats 




Individualism as a societal value is indicative of a loosely knit social fabric; 
individuals are expected to take care of themselves and their immediate 
families only. Its opposite, collectivism as a societal value is indicative of a 
preference for a tightly knit social fabric in which individuals expect their 
relatives, clan, or other in-group members to look after them in return for 
unquestioning loyalty. The fundamental feature addressed by this dimension 
is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among individuals. It 
relates to people’s self-concept: “I” or “we” (Gray, 1988). 
                                                          
















                                                          





 Period1 Period2 Period3 Period4 MEAN*
Group 0.64 0.82 2.82 3.00 2.21
Individual 0.45 1.73 2.09 2.09 1.97

PanelB:Meanlevelofindividualinnovationseachperiodb
 Period1 Period2 Period3 Period4 MEAN*
Group 7.64 10.82 9.55 9.64 10.00
Individual 7.27 9.45 10.45 10.09 10.00

PanelC:Meanlevelofprofiteachperiodc
 Period1 Period2 Period3 Period4 MEAN*
Group $3.14 $0.14 $1.36 $4.91 2.14













a Cooperative Innovations are measured by counting the number of innovations instigated in the 
period where at least two participants were required to cooperate for the innovation.  The number 
represents the total number of different types of group innovation per group, per period. 
b Individual Innovations are measured by counting the number of innovations instigated in the period 
for each participant.  Individual innovations did not require to cooperation between participants.  The 
number represents the total number of individual innovations (the sum of all group members), per 
group, per period. 






   Source of Variation 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean
Square F Sig. 
Between Subjects           
Incentive c 0.970 1 0.970 0.081 0.779
  Error 239.152 20 11.958     
Within Subjects d           
Periode 22.182 1.49 14.889 7.905 0.004 
Period * Incentive 11.030 1.49 7.404 3.931 0.042 
  Error 56.121 29.796 1.884     

PanelBIndividualInnovations f:
   Source of Variation 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Subjects           
Incentive c 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 0.949 
  Error 351.333 20 17.567     
Within Subjects g           
Periode 0.818 2 0.409 0.200 0.820 
Period * Incentive 15.909 2 7.955 3.883 0.029 
  Error 81.939 40 2.048     

PanelCProfitabilityh:
   Source of Variation 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Subjects           
Incentive c 162.307 1 162.307 4.500 0.047
  Error 721.349 20 36.067     
Within Subjectsg           
Periode 131.546 2 65.773 12.844 0.001
Period * Incentive 34.455 2 17.227 3.364 0.047





a This ANOVA is based on 66 observations, being of 22 groups for 3 periods.  The model is a two 
factor mixed design model.  The two factors are incentive (group versus individual compensation) and 
period (being periods 2, 3 and 4).  As the dependent variable is measured over a number of periods, a 
repeated measure design is used. 
b Cooperative Innovations are measured by counting the number of innovations instigated in the 
period where at least two participants were required to cooperate for the innovation.  The number 
represents the total number of different types of group innovation per group, per period. 
c Incentive: the between-subject variation between the treatment groups given an individual incentive 
structure and those given a group incentive structure. 
d The results from Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that we must reject the assumption of 
sphericity of the data (p. 0.019).  Therefore Within subject effects are reported after making the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction.  The results remain the same under the Sphericity Assumed and 
Huynh-Feldt correction models. 
e Period: the within-subject variation between periods 2, 3 and 4.  
f Individual Innovations are measured by counting the number of innovations instigated in the period 
for each participant.  Individual innovations did not require to cooperation between participants.  The 
number represents the total number of individual innovations (the sum of all group members), per 
group, per period. 
g The results from Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity of the data 
cannot be rejected (Panel B Individual innovations model, p. 0.676; Panel C Performance model, p. 
0.289). 
h Profitability is total revenue less total expense for each group divided by the number of participants. 
